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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to describe a nitrogen based deposit-refund system for 
regulating non-point nitrogen emissions from agriculture. We develop a formal model of a 
polluting production sector with substance content of inputs and outputs as an explicit quality 
dimension. With in this framework two input-output based tax schemes for regulation of 
agricultural nitrogen emissions are compared while taking regulator monitoring costs into 
account. Incentive regulation of nitrogen emissions from Danish agriculture is discussed in this 
light. It is concluded that a nitrogen based deposit-refund system seems a logical focal point of 
analysis for a policymaker considering introduction of incentive regulation of non-point 
nitrogen emissions from agriculture. 
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1. Introduction 
Emission of nitrates and ammonia from agriculture are considered important environmental 
problems in many European countries and regulation through norms and standards for 
agricultural practices and production technology is widely applied. 
In Denmark, a national system of norms and standards was implemented in 1987 and 
it has been tightened several times since. The Danish experience has been that regulation by 
norms and standards has not had the desired effect on nitrogen emissions, partly because 
compliance has not been controlled effectively, and partly because of a disappointing effect on 
leaching of those regulations that have been controlled effectively. It seems reasonable to 
conclude from national Danish studies (Rude, 1987; Hansen, 1991; Dubgaard, 1991; Rude, 
1991) that reaching the environmental goals in Denmark will entail substantial compliance and 
control costs if norms and standards are used. This has brought the potential advantages of 
incentive based regulation as an alternative to norms and standards into focus in the Danish 
policy discussion. The interest in incentive based regulation of agricultural nitrogen emissions 
seems also to be increasing in other European countries and in the EU.   
Incentive regulation based on direct measurement of nitrate and ammonia emissions 
(i.e. first-best Pigovian emission taxation) is not feasible due to high measurement costs. 
However, administratively cheap taxes on chemical fertilizer have been applied in e.g. Austria, 
Finland Norway and Sweden as have taxes on livestock fodder in e.g. the Netherlands. 
Recently, the Netherlands has implemented in a farm level tax on calculated nitrogen loss 
(based on the MINAS farm level nutrient accounting system). This incentive system is more 
administratively demanding, but may also come closer to emulating first-best Pigovian 
incentives. Finally there is a growing theoretical literature on regulatory mechanisms for 
non-point emissions based on measured ambient concentrations of pollutant in the damaged 
ecosystem
1
. Such mechanisms can (under certain conditions) emulate the Pigovian tax 
incentives and may therefore be able to induce first best allocations. However taxes based on 
ambient concentrations have not been applied in practise and are not as yet a viable policy 
alternative. In the following the first best Pigovian allocation serves only as an ideal reference 
                                                 
1
 Basing emission taxes on ambient concentrations was originally suggested by 
Segerson (1988). See Dosi and Tomasi (1994) for a state of the art collection of papers and e.g. 
 Smith and Tomasi (1995), Xepapadeas (1997), Hansen (1998) and Horan et al. (1998) 
 for more recent contributions.   
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point for evaluating more realistic second best regulatory schemes.     
In this paper we present a formal model for analysing the allocative properties of 
different second-best input/output tax schemes for regulating nitrogen emissions (including the 
schemes mentioned above) and then introduce monitoring costs into the model in a simple, but 
consistent way. The main purpose of this paper is to describe a nitrogen based deposit-refund 
system for regulating non-point nitrogen emissions from agriculture and compare it with 
charges based on calculated residual substance loss at the farm level (like the Dutch MINAS 
system)
2
. 
In section 2 we develop a formal model  (inspired by Holtermann, 1976) of a polluting 
production sector (i.e  agriculture) as a common framework for comparing the allocative 
properties of different input-output based incentive schemes. We then introduce a simple 
explicit representation of regulator monitoring costs in order to compare the schemes in a 
setting with substantial monitoring costs and second-best abatement incentives. In section 3 
incentive regulation of nitrogen emissions from Danish agriculture is discussed as an example 
after a presentation of the Danish agricultural system and nitrogen related environmental 
problems. In section 4 it is concluded that a nitrogen based deposit-refund system would seem 
a logical focal point of analysis for a policy maker considering introduction of sector level 
incentive regulation of non-point nitrogen emissions from agriculture. 
 
2. Incentive Regulation of Agricultural Nitrogen Emissions 
                                                 
2
 The allocative properties of charges based on calculated residual substance loss at 
the farm level (like the Dutch MINAS system) have been analysed by e.g. Huang and LeBlanc, 
1994, and  Fontein et al., 1994. The potential administrative advantages of deposit-refund 
systems have been pointed out in the literature by e.g Bohm, 1981; Bohm and Russell, 1985 
Huppes, 1993. 
Compared to other production sectors the agricultural sector has numerous and small firms. 
Nitrogen flow on a typical farm is illustrated in Figure 1. Animal husbandry takes crops and 
feed bought on the market as inputs producing animal products (which are sold on the market) 
and manure used on the farm as outputs. Manure may be used on the farm or sold. Crop 
production has crops sold and crops used as animal feed on the farm as output categories with 
manure and chemical fertilizer as input categories. The aggregate goods described are 
composed of a large number of primary goods all containing nitrogen and nitrogen may be 
  5 
leached in several qualitatively different forms from the crop process (nitrate leaching and 
N2/N2O loss through denitrification) and from the animal husbandry process (ammonia 
evaporation). 
  6 
Fig. 1. Illustration of Nitrogen flow on a typical farm  
 
2.1 THE MODEL 
In order to develop a formal model assume that the agricultural sector consists of n profit 
maximizing farms each potentially emitting r different harmful nitrogen compounds while 
producing one and consuming another subset of the m agricultural input and output goods in the 
economy.  
Many of the m goods contain nitrogen and we assume that each good has two quality 
dimensions: one proportional to the goods' usual volume measure and one proportional to the 
goods' nitrogen content. Thus a shipment of good i supplied to farm k from farm j is 
characterised by its volume measure ( yijk )  and its nitrogen content ( nijk = αijk*  yijk  where αijk 
is the corresponding unit nitrogen content that may vary across producers of the same good)
3
. 
Let  yij denote the total net output of good i from farm j (output being positively signed) and let 
  nij  denote the total net output of nitrogen contained in good i from farm j (output being 
                                                 
3
 In some cases the volume measure is correlated with nitrogen volume. In case of 
perfect correlation (e.g. nitrogen fertilizer) αijk is constant across producers.  
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positively signed). We then have that  
n+1
i j ki j
k=1
  = y y   and  _
n+1
i j ki j
k=1
 =  n n where subscript 
k=n+1 indicates net exports to the rest of the economy
4
.  In the following we use the shorter 
notation  y*j  to denote the vector (y1j, ... ,ymj) ,  y**  to denote the vector 
(y11, ... ,y1n,y21, ... ,y2n, ... ,yij, ... ,ym1, ... ,ymn) etc. 
Each farm is characterized by a well behaved production function 
j
*j*j
 (  ,  )  0f y n  .  
Formally this is a multi output production function with 2m goods, but we generally expect the 
good and its nitrogen content to be highly complementary outputs in production. Goods of a 
given type supplied by different producers are perfect substitutes as is nitrogen contained in a 
given good type supplied by different producers (i.e. before production the farm mixes all 
inputs of a given type to form a homogenous input good). Each good and its nitrogen content 
are bought and sold in the relevant goods market as a composite good and we assume existence 
of perfectly competitive markets for all m goods with given world market prices for each 
quality dimension ( pi
y
 and pi
n
). Thus, the price for a given good shipment   yijk  is pijk =  pi
y
 +αijk 
pi
n 
. For some goods nitrogen content is not in itself a valuable attribute in which case  pi
n
 will 
be zero. In other cases  pi
n
 will be positive (e.g. manure, composite fertilizers etc.). 
Further, each farm is characterised by a set of  r emission functions 
qj
qj *j*j
 =  (   )g y nz  
where zqj denotes the amount of nitrogen compound of type q emitted by farm j
5
. The 
environmental damage function is denoted **U ( )z . 
The model allows farms to have different multi-output production technologies and 
each good to have a continuum of quality types depending on nitrogen content. Goods 
produced by some farms may be used as input by others. Some goods may be used exclusively 
as intermediate goods and some goods may be exclusively imported from or exported to the rest 
of the economy. Finally, environmental damage caused by emissions may vary across emission 
types and across farms.  
Pareto optimum is found by maximising the sum of farm profits and environmental 
damage subject to the production function constraints giving the following lagrangian: 
                                                 
4
 When  yijk is positive it indicates the volume of good i produced by farm j supplied to 
farm k. When  yijk is negative it indicates the volume of good i used by farm j supplied from farm 
k. Thus by definition  yijk = - yikj .  
5
 This specification of the emission function follows Holtermann (1976). 
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y n 1 1 q j r n
i j *1 *j *ni i j i *1 *j *n
i j
j
j *j*j
j
(  + ) + U ( (  ,  ) ... (  ,  ) ... (  ,  ))p y p g y g y g yn n n n
 -     (  ,  )f y n


  (1) 
If the regulating agency can implement farm specific input and output taxes and 
subsidies as well as emission charges market equilibrium is found by letting farms maximize 
profit net of emission taxes subject to the production function constraint giving the following 
set of lagrangian functions: 
y ny n
i j i j i ji i j i
i
qj jz
q j *j *jj*j *j
q
[(  -  )  + (  -   )]p y pt t n
 -    (  ,  ) -   (  ,  )g y f yt n n


  for j = 1  n    (2) 
where zqjt is a farm and type specific emission tax and 
y
ijt and 
n
ijt are good and farm specific tax 
/subsidy based on each of the two quality dimensions of the m traded composite goods. Using 
( ****,y n ) as control variables this gives the following first order condition for : 
 
Pareto optimum [from (1)] 
 
i j i j
y q j j
q j ji y y
q
 + [ ] -   = 0p g fU   
i j i j
n q j j
q j ji n n
q
 + [ ] -   = 0p g fU   
for i=1 m , j =1 n  
 
Market equilibrium [from (2)] 
 
i j i j
y q j jy z
i j q j ji y y
q
(  - ) - [ ] -   = 0p g ft t    
i j i j
n q j jn z
i j q j ji n n
q
(  - ) - [ ] -   = 0p g ft t   
for i=1 m , j =1 n   
 
There are in general many tax solutions that are consistent with Pareto optimum. Among these 
is the standard uniform emission charge solution characterized by: 
z
q j q j = -t U  for q = 1 r , j = 1 n    
y
i j = 0t  for i=1 m , j =1 n      
 ni j = 0t  for i=1 m , j =1 n  
where no input/output taxes are levied. Such a charge cannot be implemented when emissions 
are non-point
6
. 
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  As noted above emulating an emission tax through charges based on ambient 
concentrations is an intriguing theoretical possibility, but at present not a viable policy 
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However, Pareto optimum may also be achieved by a system of input-output tax/sub-
sidies alone without levying emission taxes. This solution is characterized by: 
z
q j = 0t  for q = 1 r , j = 1 n  
ij
qjy
i j qj y
q
 = -   gt U  for i = 1 m , j = 1 n     
 
ij
qjn
i j qj n
q
 = -   gt U  for i = 1 m , j = 1 n  
Thus the regulator must calculate and apply the following set of taxes: 
ijij
qj qjy n
i j k i j i j qj i j ky n
q
 =  + = -   (  - )g gt t t U   for i = 1 m , j = 1 n, k = 1 n+1  (3) 
In order to implement this tax-subsidy system the regulator must acquire knowledge 
of each farm's set of emission functions  g
qj
(.)  each farms complete input-output vector  y***  
and the corresponding vector of unit nitrogen content coefficients α*** .  
 
2.2 MASS-BALANCES AND INPUT/OUTPUT BASED REGULATION  
                                                                                                                                                        
alternative vis- à-vis agricultural nitrogen emissions.   
When the sector to be regulated consists of many technologically different farms (as is the case 
for agriculture) the regulator's information and control costs of calculating and controlling the 
tax-subsidy system given by (3) would be substantial. However, under certain assumptions the 
regulator's implementation problem can be simplified by use of mass-balance conditions. 
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We know that the general mass-balance condition must hold for any given substance 
that like nitrogen is not destroyed or created through the production process. Assuming that the 
mass-balance equation also holds when it is restricted to marketed inputs and outputs and 
emissions we have
7
:    
 
z
qjq j i j ki j k
q i k
 yz  = -     j = 1  n      (4) 
where zq j denote the weight of nitrogen per unit of emission q. Inserting 
q j
q j = (.)gz and nijk = 
αijk*  yijk  and differentiating with respect to yij we have: 
 
  
i ji j
qj qjz
q j ijk i j ky n
q
g g (  +  ) = -             j = 1  n ,k = 1  n+1   (5) 
so that the effect on total nitrogen emission of a marginal change in any input or output is the 
unit nitrogen content of that input or output (appropriately signed).  We now define the first 
critical assumption that environmental damage only is a function of emitted nitrogen at the 
given location and is independent of type of emission through which nitrogen is lost i.e.: 
 
Assumption I:  zq j qkj =  U U            q = 1  r      (6) 
where jU  is environmental damage of emitted nitrogen at location j. Given this assumption we 
have: 
ij ijij ij
qj qj qj qjz
i j k qj i j k q j i j k i j kj jy yn n
q q
 = -   (  - )= -   (  - ) = g g g gt U U U      
by inserting (6) and (5) into (3). 
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 With the important exception of leguminous plants (to which we will return in the 
next section) the assumption would seem to hold for nitrogen in the agricultural sector. 
Thus, under assumption I the mass-balance condition ensures that Pareto optimal tax 
rates can be calculated by the regulator without him having to acquire knowledge of  each 
farm's set of emission functions g
qj
(.). However, knowledge of  each farm's input-output vector 
  y***  and the corresponding vector of unit nitrogen content coefficients α*** are still required. 
Now define the second critical assumption that damage per unit nitrogen emitted does 
not vary across farms, i.e.: 
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Assumption II:  j = UU           j = 1  n      (7) 
where U  is environmental damage of emitted nitrogen. Under assumption II the Pareto optimal 
tax rates then become:  
 
i j k i j kz =  t U     i = 1  m , i = 1  n , k = 1  n  (8) 
Since farm j's output (input) of good i delivered to (received from) farm k is the same 
physical good flow as farm k's input (output) of good i received from (delivered to) farm j we 
have by definition:  
i j k i k j =      i = 1  m , j = 1  n , k = 1  n+1  (9) 
so that for each market transaction of good i between two farms we have  
i j k i j k i k j i k j = U  = U  = t t   i = 1  m , j = 1  n , k = 1  n+1  (10) 
Though the tax rates that are to be applied differ for different shipments of a given good the tax 
rate to be applied to the buyer and to the seller of a given shipment of any good is always the 
same (i.e., the unit tax to be applied to the buyer is numerically equal to the unit subsidy to be 
paid to the seller).  
When implementing a tax (or subsidy) on a shipment of goods being transacted in a 
competitive market it is irrelevant whether the tax (or subsidy) is actually collected from (paid 
to) the buyer or the seller. Thus tax collection/subsidy payment may be shifted from the buyer 
to the seller or vice versa without affecting the resulting market transaction. We may then 
concentrate tax collection/subsidy payment on one side of the market by either shifting tax 
collection to the supply-side of the market or by shifting payment of subsidies to the demand 
side of the market without affecting market equilibrium. When we do this taxes and subsidies 
with respect to trade among farms inside the sector cancel out (since the applied rates to buyer 
and seller are numerically equal). Thus, implementation of the optimal indirect tax system only 
necessitates collecting taxes from the rest of the economy when supplying goods to the sector 
and paying subsidies to the rest of the economy when receiving goods from the sector. Thus, 
under assumptions I and II Pareto optimal incentives can be achieved by implementing a 
deposit-refund system for the sector based on the mass conserved substance (nitrogen) with the 
deposit/refund rate equal to the corresponding optimal emission charge per unit of the 
substance. Not having to engage in control of sector internal trades (i.e. control for tax/subsidy 
arbitrage between farms inside the production sector) further reduces the regulator's 
  12 
implementation problem since the regulator only needs to control flows to and from the sector 
(i.e. only requiring knowledge of the part of the input-output vector interacting with the rest of 
the economy    y**k+1  and the corresponding vector of unit nitrogen content coefficients α**k+1). 
 
2.3. TRADING OFF REGULATION BENEFITS AND MONITORING COSTS 
In the previous subsection we showed necessary conditions (assumptions I and II) for 
Pareto optimality of tax  schemes with successively smaller demands on the regulator's 
information and control effort. In general, these conditions are not satisfied and the crucial 
policy question is whether the loss in private regulation benefits entailed by simpler regulatory 
systems is outweighed by the resulting savings on regulator monitoring costs. In the following 
we make a number of heroic assumptions in order to get a manageable expression of the 
second-best regulation choice problem. The resulting analysis is based on what may be called 
a first order approximation of the second-best choice problem and does bring some important 
aspects of the problem into focus.    
We assume that marginal environmental damage rates U’(z**) are constant and follow 
a bivariate normal distribution Φ(u,u,υq,υf ,0) where  u denotes mean marginal environmental 
damage of nitrogen emission across farms and emission types,  υq denotes variance of marginal 
environmental damage of nitrogen emission over emission types,  υf denotes variance of 
marginal environmental damage of nitrogen emission over farms and covariance is assumed to 
be zero. Without regulation   u ,  υq ,  υf  also characterise the distribution of the resulting 
emission price distortions, and note that υq is an indicator of the magnitude of the system's 
deviation from assumption I (i.e. if assumption I holds υq = 0) and υf  is an indicator of  the 
magnitude of the system's deviation from assumption II (i.e. if assumption II holds υq = 0). 
When a regulatory incentive scheme is introduced emission price distortions are 
changed (reduced). Let t denote the average marginal cost of emission induced by a given tax 
system and let τq denote the resulting reduction in emission price distortion variance over 
emission types and let  τf denote the resulting reduction in emission price distortion variance 
over farms eliminated. With regulation the distribution of the remaining emission price 
distortions has a mean of u - t and variances of  υq -  τq and   υf -  τf in the two respective 
dimensions. Let L(u - t,υq -   τq , υf - τf ) denote expected welfare loss from the mis-allocation 
caused by the emission price distortions remaining after implementation of the regulatory 
scheme. If all emission price distortions are corrected by the regulatory scheme then mean and 
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variance of the remaining price distortions are zero and there is no welfare loss from 
mis-allocation (i.e. by definition L(0,0,0) = 0). If mean distortion deviates from zero, expected 
welfare loss increases. Further increasing variance of resulting distortions also increases 
welfare loss because of the standard convexity assumptions. Thus, allocation benefit of 
implementing a tax scheme becomes B(u-t ,υq-τq,υf-τf) =L(u ,υq,υf) - L(u-t ,υq-τq,υf-τf) where B(.) 
is concave and has its maximum in B(0,0,0). 
Costs of monitoring a tax scheme are assumed to be a function of incentives to engage 
in tax evasion. Let n f(t,  )c  denote average costs of controlling a tax scheme at the farm level 
where t indicates incentives to engage in illicit trade with firms outside the sector and τf 
indicates incentives to engage in illicit trade with farms inside the sector. Let s(t)c  denote 
average costs of controlling a tax scheme at a firm trading with the agricultural sector (grain 
and feedstuff firms, dairies and slaughterhouses) where t indicates incentives to engage in illicit 
trade with other firms inside or outside the agricultural sector. Let s be the number of firms 
outside the agricultural sector engaging in trade with farms inside the agricultural sector and 
remember that n is the number of farms in the sector. 
When implementing a residual substance loss tax scheme the regulator can select t and 
τf whereas τq = 0 and as noted monitoring is at the farm level so that n farms must be controlled. 
The regulator's problem is to set t and τf so as to maximise allocation benefits less monitoring 
costs: 
MAX
n
q f f f
f
  B(u - t, , - ) - n (t, )c
t,
   

 
Let t
R
 and τf
R
 denote the solution to this problem. 
When implementing a deposit-refund scheme the regulator can only select t whereas 
τf = 0 and τq = 0 and as noted only the s firms outside the agricultural sector trading with it need 
to be controlled. The regulators problem is  
MAX
s
q f  B(u -t, , ) - s (t)c
t
   
Let t
D
 denote the solution to this problem. 
When choosing between the two instruments the regulator should compare allocation 
 benefits less monitoring costs at the optimal parameter values for each instrument: 
 
Allocation benefit      less       monitoring costs  
  14 
Residual substance loss:  B(u-t
R
 , υf-τf 
R,υq-0)  - n
n R R
f(  , )c t  
Deposit-refund system:     B(u-t
D
 ,υf -0,υq -0)  - s
s D( )c t  
 
Two important factors influence the comparison: 
-  The monitoring cost advantage of a deposit-refund system increases with the n/s-ratio 
(i.e. with the number of farms in the sector relative to the number of firms in the rest 
of the economy engaging in trade with the sector). 
- The potential allocative advantage of using residual substance loss regulation grows 
with σf  but if the potential is utilized so does its monitoring cost disadvantage.   
When comparing the two instruments for a given regulation problem the key 
parameters to evaluate are  the n/s- ratio (and the corresponding monitoring cost ratio) and τf  
(the part of  uf that can be alleviated by residual substance loss regulation when account is taken 
of the effect on monitoring costs). If costs of monitoring the residual substance loss scheme 
increase significantly when tax rates are differentiated between farms its allocative advantage 
is reduced and may not outweigh the general increase in monitoring cost associated with farm 
level monitoring.   
 
3. Incentive Regulation of Agricultural Nitrogen Emissions in Practice   
In this section we present a description of the nitrogen cycle and production processes in the 
Danish agricultural sector and a qualitative assessment of key parameters pointed out above.  
We then make a tentative comparison of regulating residual substance loss at the farm level  
with a deposit-refund system and define the role for input-output based regulation with in a 
more comprehensive system of regulatory measures for agricultural nitrogen emissions.  
Finally, we attempt an informal analysis of different variations over the simple single rate 
deposit-refund system with the aim of pointing to administratively manageable improvements. 
 
3.1. NITROGEN EMISSION AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN DENMARK 
Nitrogen flow in the Danish agricultural sector is illustrated in Figure 2. Animal husbandry 
takes crops and feed imported from the rest of the economy as inputs producing animal 
products (which are sold to the rest of the economy) and manure as outputs. Crop production 
has crop sold to the rest of the economy and crops used as animal feed as output categories with 
manure and chemical fertilizer as input categories. All the aggregate goods described contain 
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nitrogen. In Figure 2 storage and spreading of manure are considered part of the animal 
husbandry process. 
  16 
Fig. 2. Average annual nitrogen flow (1993/94-1995/96) for the Danish agricultural 
sector (numbers indicate flow in thousand tons nitrogen) 
Note: The diagram is based on Linddal, 1998. Of the total nitrogen loss from crop production it is estimated that nitrate 
leaching accounts for at about 200 thousand tons nitrogen. Other nitrogen input to crop production consists of nitrogen 
fixation (41 thousand tons) and nitrogen deposition (67 thousand tons). Calculations assume zero net growth of nitrogen 
stock in humus, as reliable estimates of net growth are not available.   
 
 
   Danish agriculture is characterised by a sizable dairy production and a large 
production of pork meat. Thus, manure loading per hectare is relatively high by European 
standards (although still substantially smaller than e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands, see e.g. 
Brouwer et al., 1995). Figure 2 indicates that the nitrogen flow through each of the two 
aggregate production processes is comparable in size and that there are large flows of nitrogen 
between the two production processes. Nitrogen loss in per cent of flow through for the 
aggregate crop process increases significantly with the proportion of manure to fertilizer used 
in crop production.  
Each of the aggregate goods is composed of a large number of goods with large 
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variations in nitrogen content. Studies of the production processes of different crops show large 
variations in nitrogen loss in per cent of economically optimal flow through (all other things 
being equal) and that several important low flow through crops have relatively high nitrogen 
loss percentages while some high flow through crops have low loss percentages. The nitrogen 
loss percentage for a given crop rises with increased nitrogen flow through, all other things 
being equal. The use of catch crops generally reduces nitrogen-loss percentages, all other things 
being equal. 
Loss of nitrogen percentages for animal husbandry processes themselves primarily 
depends on other factors than the output type (e.g. stall and storage facilities and method of 
manure spreading), however, nitrogen loss percentages from manure during and after spreading 
are to some extent influenced by feed composition and output (livestock) type. Generally, 
nitrogen loss from manure after spreading is greatly influenced by the timing of manure 
spreading relative to crop growth etc. 
It is safe to say that there is no simple relationship between Nitrogen emission and a 
subset of inputs used. Nitrogen loss is related in a complex way to most input-output flows 
containing nitrogen. It is also notable that nitrogen content in a number of major inputs and 
outputs is measured today as it is important for production decisions and output valuation. 
  Mass-conservation in traded goods and emissions would seem to hold for nitrogen. It 
is, however, important to note that though nitrogen fixating leguminous crops are not a 
substantial input category at present, they are a potentially important alternative to marketed 
nitrogen inputs. It should also be noted that the stock of nitrogen in the system is large 
compared to flow through. Nitrogen stocks in field humus are probably on the order of 25 to 50 
times as large as flow through (Miljøstyrelsen, 1993) though only a small part of this stock is 
accessible in the short run. 
As indicated in Figure 2 several nitrogen compounds are emitted. The animal hus-
bandry processes (including manure storage and spreading) primarily emit ammonia gas (NH3) 
while crop processes primarily emit water-diluted nitrates (NO3
-
) through leaching and a mix 
of N2 and N20 gases through denitrification. Soil composition, temperature and rainfall are the 
factors of primary importance to the proportion of nitrogen loss through denitrification to loss 
through leaching  (Lind et al., 1990). These factors are not controlled by farmers. The way these 
uncontrolled factors affect denitrification may cause systematic and quite substantial 
differences in the proportion of denitrification to leaching from region to region. The 
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proportion of N2O to N2 when denitrification occurs is highly volatile and does not seem to dep-
end in any stable and systematic way on the type of fertilizer used or on factors that vary 
regionally (Lind et al., 1990). 
 
Table I. Environmental problems caused by nitrogen emissions from agriculture 
 
 
Nitrogen compound: 
 
Local/regional 
damages: 
 
Inter-regional 
damages: 
 
Global damages: 
 
Ammonia eva-
poration (NH3): 
 
- Eutrophication of 
lakes and other eco-
systems 
 
- Eutrophication of 
coastal sea areas and 
other ecosystems 
 
 
- Acid rain 
 
- Global warming 
 
- Ozone depletion 
 
(2. order effects 
through denitrifi-
cation)  
 
Nitrate leaching 
(NO3
-
): 
 
- Contamination of 
ground water 
 
- Eutrophication of 
lakes 
 
- Eutrophication of 
coastal sea areas 
 
- Global warming 
 
- Ozone depletion 
 
(2. order effects 
through denitrifi-
cation) 
 
Denitrified N2O: 
 
none 
 
none 
 
- Global warming 
 
- Ozone depletion 
 
Denitrified N2: 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
A number of environmental effects of the emitted nitrogen compounds have been sited 
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in Danish studies (Fenger, 1989; Gundersen, 1989; Miljøstyrelsen 1990 and 1993). These are 
specified in Table I ranked according to whether the effect is regional, interregional or global. 
Valuation of these damages may lead to substantial differences in average damage 
caused per ton emitted nitrogen through the three emission processes. Emission effects on 
interregional environmental problems also vary spatially depending on diffusion and removal 
in natural eco-systems during diffusion.   
 
3.2 THE ROLE OF MASS-BALANCE BASED REGULATION OF NITROGEN 
EMISSIONS FROM DANISH AGRICULTURE  
The fundamental assumption of mass conservation in traded goods and emissions and 
of competitive markets would seem to hold for nitrogen in the agricultural sector
8
.  Further, the 
potential problem of excess farm information costs that mass-balance based regulation may 
induce is probably limited. Information on nitrogen content is an important quality parameter 
for farmers today and is in many cases already being measured. Nitrogen emissions are causally 
connected with nitrogen contents of a wide spectrum of inputs and outputs, so if increased 
measurement is induced in most cases this will not be inefficient. 
The two assumptions necessary for achieving a first-best solution with a 
deposit-refund system or a residual substance loss regulation are clearly not satisfied since 
environmental damage from nitrogen emissions probably varies substantially across emission 
types and across farms (i.e. υf >>0 and υq >>0). Thus, when comparing a deposit-refund system 
with residual substance loss regulation the second-best comparison undertaken in the previous 
section is the relevant framework. 
                                                 
8
 It should be noted that if non-marketed nitrogen input to agriculture through 
N-fixating leguminous plants becomes a problem supplementary regulation (e.g. by taxing 
output of these crops, seed inputs or acreage) may become necessary. Also the implicit capital 
costs of nitrogen stocks that an input-output based incentive regulation would impose on 
farmers should be noted . The implicit capital costs give farmers an inefficient incentive to 
reduce nitrogen stocks. 
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The agricultural sector is characterized by having many relatively small farms. At the 
same time the major part of trade volume with the rest of the economy is channelled through 
relatively few wholesale suppliers and wholesale crop firms and relatively few large 
slaughterhouses, dairy processing firms and other food processing firms. On the output side 
private households constitute a potential alternative outlet for farm goods, however, since 
mass-balance tax schemes imply refunds for outputs this does not pose a control problem
9
. 
Thus the sector is characterised by a high n/s-ratio indicating that the administrative cost 
savings of moving from control at the farm level to control at the sector level may be substanti-
al. Further, although environmental damage varies substantially across farms (i.e. υf >>0) the 
notorious problems of controlling inter-farm trades in the agricultural sector suggests that only 
a small part of this potential can be efficiently captured by  residual substance loss regulation 
(i.e. τf  0). 
This and the high n/s-ratio indicate that the monitoring cost advantages of 
deposit-refund regulation vis-à-vis residual substance loss regulation may offset its allocative 
disadvantages.  
Within a more comprehensive system of regulatory measures for agricultural nitrogen 
emissions deposit-refund regulation might have an important role to play as an administratively 
cheap baseline regulation to be supplemented by controllable farm level regulations like 
production norms in high damage regions.  
Residual substance loss regulation may have a role to play as supplementary 
regulation in high damage regions. However, other farm level regulatory systems that are not 
susceptible to inter-farm arbitrage problems may also be relevant. Systematic differentiation of 
production norms and standards (e.g. manure storage capacity requirements, manure spreading 
rule etc.) between farms has not been attempted in Denmark, but the possibility of doing so is 
an important characteristic of this type of farm level regulatory instruments. 
 
3.3. OPTIMISING DEPOSIT-REFUND REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL NITROGEN 
EMISSIONS. 
                                                 
9
 Actually a mass-balance based scheme may have a substantial advantage since 
incentives to evade VAT and income tax through ‘black market’ sales to households are 
reduced. 
In this subsection we proceed on the assumption that it is reasonable to give a sector level 
  21 
deposit-refund system the role of an administratively cheap baseline regulation of nitrogen 
emissions and consider whether differentiation of taxes and subsidy rates between goods might 
improve regulatory performance since damage as noted in section 3.1 probably varies across 
emission types. We address the simple fertilizer tax in this context as it can be seen as an 
(extreme) example of rate differentiation. 
The discussion will be conducted within the framework of the aggregate two-sector, 
six good model illustrated in Figure 3. We consider specification of four policy variables (t1 and 
t2 being input taxes per unit nitrogen in feed and fertilizer respectively and s1 and s2 being 
output subsidies per unit nitrogen in products from animal husbandry and crop production 
respectively). Average damage per unit nitrogen emitted being d1 and d2 for animal husbandry 
and crop production respectively. 
 
Fig. 3. Aggregated model of the agricultural production system under sector level 
incentive regulation    
 
If the regulator has a reliable aggregate model describing inputs, outputs and 
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emissions it is possible to optimize the regulatory system (at the aggregation level of the model) 
by differentiating taxes and subsidies between goods. Here we only attempt a tentative 
discussion basis of the general structure of aggregate production functions. 
When there are substantial differences in d1 and d2  the ideal solution would be 
separate deposit-refund systems for each emission type so a natural starting point would be to 
differentiate between tax/subsidies for animal husbandry on one hand and tax/subsidies for 
crops on the other so that t1=s1=d1 and t2=s2=d2. If traded products between the two agricultural 
sectors have low elasticities of substitution then the distortions created by not being able to 
apply net taxes of t1-s2 per unit nitrogen to the import of feed to animal husbandry and net taxes 
of t2-s1 for the import of manure to crop production are small and the optimal system of 
input-output taxes will resemble the differentiated system above. If, however, trade volume is 
large and the possibilities of substitution are good in both sectors the optimal system will 
resemble a uniform rate system. As N-trade volume between the animal husbandry and crop 
sectors is large and substitution possibilities are good the welfare loss of not differentiating 
taxes and subsidies over goods may be small even when damage rates differ substantially. 
The policy discussion in Denmark has until recently been centred on the pros et cons 
of regulation by input charges alone and in particular centred on regulation by an input charge 
on chemical fertilizer (i.e. setting s1=s2=t1=0). Since this type of regulation also has been in 
focus in other countries we attempt a qualitative efficiency comparison of input charges with 
the uniform rate deposit-refund system. 
For an input charge based system to come close to optimality, emissions should be 
close to proportional to inputs. From the description in subsection 3.1 it is clear that this is far 
from being the case. The large variations in loss-percentages between different crops (where 
possibilities of substitution clearly are large) and between crops and animal husbandry as such 
suggest that the efficiency cost of regulation by input charges is appreciable. The gain vis-à-vis 
a uniform rate deposit-refund system is saved monitoring costs since the regulator would only 
have to control nitrogen fertilizer flow to the sector. Whether saved measurement costs can 
outweigh efficiency losses from distorted incentives is an empirical question. However, if 
governments are considering incentive regulation of nitrogen emissions at the sector level there 
would seem to be strong arguments for making a nitrogen based deposit-refund system rather 
than a fertilizer tax the  focal point of policy evaluation or at least including such a system in the 
spectrum of policy alternatives being considered. 
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4. Conclusion 
A Nitrogen based deposit-refund system could have an important role to play as an 
administratively cheap  baseline regulation of nitrogen emissions to be supplemented by farm 
level regulation in high damage areas (such as production norms etc. and possibly farm level 
residual nitrogen loss taxes).  
If there are substantial differences in damage caused by the different nitrogen 
compounds being emitted and the regulator has a reliable aggregate model describing inputs, 
outputs and emissions it is possible to increase efficiency of a sector level deposit-refund 
system by differentiating taxes and subsidies for different goods. If fine tuned optimisation 
along these lines is not possible then a simple uniform rate nitrogen based deposit-refund 
system (rather than a tax on fertilizer) seems the logical starting point for a policy maker 
seeking a cost-effective base line incentive scheme for regulating nitrogen emissions from 
agriculture.  
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